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Abstract
The conventional Structure-Conduct-Performance approach to the
study of banking competition has failed to produce the understanding
sought by bankers, students of banking, and policymakers. While
the unsatisfactory empirical results may derive, in part, from
inadequate data and improper statistical techniques--i.e., from
imperfect applications of the approach__the available evidence
suggests that they are explained instead by the fUndamental defects
in the approach itself. In this paper we examine the conceptual
problems inherent in the traditional approach and suggest an alternative
line of inquiry which may be more fruitful.A Criticism of Traditional Research on Banking Competition
Dale Osborne* and Jeanne Wendel**
The shop seemed to be full of all manner of
curious things. But whenever Alice looked
hard at any shelf, to make out exactly what
it had on it, that particular shelf was always
quite empty.
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland
Public policy toward banking competition in this country rests,
as all public policy in every field must rest, on the assumptions, hypothe-
ses, conventions, and selected empirical findings that constitute a
conventional wisdom. In this case the conventional wisdom is that of the
Structure-Conduct-Performance model of competition. It has two earmarks.
First, competition in the sense of action, or competitive behavior, is
conceptually distinct from--indeed, it is explained by--competition in
the sense of conditions, or competitive potential. Second, competitive
potential is a matter of concentration in the local market.
It is doubtful that competitive potential can be defined in a
way that completely excludes behavior, since the actions of one bank must,
*Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
**Miami University, Oxford, Ohio.2
to some extent, affect the conditions of other banks. Nonetheless. the
conceptual divorce of competitive potential from behavior is not peculiar
to S-C-P; indeed it seems essential to any model that can support utili-
tarian public policies in a more-ar-less free society. The government of
such a society cannot regularly order competitive behavior; it can only
foster competitive behavior by creating and preserving its potential. It
therefore needs a model that not only distinguishes between potential and
behavior'but also describes the former as causing the latter.*
The S-C-P model characterizes competitive potential in a particu-
lar way. It groups the country's banks into local markets and represents
the conditions facing each bank by the concentration in its market (more
accurately, in its markets, which might differ according to the service
in question). It thus assumes that banks compete--or more often, collude--
with the banks in their market but with no others, and compete the less
vigorously the m0re concentrated the market.
While the courts and regulators do not follow this approach
slavishly, at some point in their deliberations on any proposed charter,
acquisition, merger, or innovation they will consider the proposal's
effects on local-market concentration. Indeed, they could hardly do
otherwise, for S-C-P is the only model they know; it is what the students
of banking competition have given them.
*rf public policy were (classically) liberal instead of
utilitarian, it would aim at minimizing fraud and coercion instead
of increasing social utility. Then, as it would be concerned with
punishing the proscribed actions instead of fostering the prescribed
ones, it would not require a model which defines competitive conditions
to be strictly exogenous to actions.3
In this paper we argue, first, that S-C-P has not worked;
second, that its failure derives from defects in the approach itself
rather than from imperfect applications of it; and third, that it distracts
attention from the main issues.
The first point contradicts the conventional view that empirical
research has uncovered a statistically significant effect of concentration
on conduct and performance. It is true that the majority of published
studies appear to show such an effect. A recent non-evaluative survey,
for example, lists thirty_nine published studies of the relation between
concentration and profits or prices, thirty of which report at least one
relation that, though quantitatively small, appears to be statistically
significant at the five percent level (Rhoades, 1977). In that survey,
the 30/39 "success ratio" is interpreted as evidence of the basic validity
and fruitfulness of the S-C-P approach. This interpretation is doubtful
for two reasons. First, most of the surveyed studies present several tests
of the concentration-performance hypothesis; that is, they employ several
different concentration and performance variables and estimate several
different forms of the relation between them. For instance, Stolz (1976)
regresses ten different price variables on the Herfindahl index in three
different ways (linear, cubic, and hyperbolic), thus actually testing the
hypothesis thirty times; of these, only four show a statistically signi-
ficant effect. This study--one of the more careful ones--more truly repre-
sents four "successes!! in thirty "trials
ll than one success in one trial
as tabulated by Rhoades. Second, empirical research is more likely to
be published (and if circulated in working papers, noticed and remembered)
if it reports a "success" than if not. For both reasons, it is premature
to conclude that the percentage of "succeeses" falls outside the ninty-
five percent confidence interval implied by the null hypothesis. The4
conventional view very likely rests on a misleading impression of the
empirical evidence.
Many workers in the field are aware of this possibility. Even
those unaware of it tend to be uncomfortable about the quantitative
insignificance of the apparently statistically significant effects of
concentration. All, therefore, continue their efforts to perfect the
application of the approach by improving the data, clarifYing the notions
of local markets and concentration, and refining the statistical techniques.
These efforts might indeed payoff. for the existing work leaves con-
siderable room for improvement.* But the meagre results thus far obtained
must raise questions about the approach itself. These questions all point,
we believe, to one conclusion: that it is time to reevaluate the theore-
tical underpinnings of S-C-P and explore alternative approaches.
*See the evaluative surveys by Bentson (1973) and Osborne (1977).5
The Supposed Support from the Industrial Studies
s-c-p originated in research on nonfinancial industries. Its
apparent success in explaining cross-section variations in the profits
of such industries is often regarded as ample justification for its
continued use in banking research despite its poor performance there.*
We must therefore digress for a moment to consider the results of S-C-P's
interindustry applications.
Though it is now a conventional wisdom--a set of answers--
S-C-P began as an organizing rramework -for research, a .source of
questions: What are the most important dimensions of market structure and
how can they be measured~ what is the precise meaning of competitive
conduct and to what extent rs it observable? how are structure and conduct
related? These were never thought to be easy questions but they were
thought to be fruitful. S-C-P was thought, therefore, to constitute a
useful research program.
A need for compromise, however, rapidly became apparent. As
has often been observed, by economists more frequently than others,
traditional economic analysis lacks a compelling theory--or even, some
would say, a definition--of competitive conduct. Until very recently
*Thus Rhoades speaks for many when he admits to "disbelief and
frustration!! at the repeated failures to find an appreciable effect of
structure on performance, since "so many studies of the industrial sector
have found a relatively large effect..." (Rhoades, 1977, p. 16).6
it has been unable, for example, to say whether advertising is a species
of such conduct or its opposite.* This theoretical gap combined with
the trouble and expense of observing conduct to suggest a short cut:
instead of conduct itself, researchers would deal with its putative
results, which would then serve as indicators of conduct. The dominant
line of research--the line most influential on antitrust policy--has
found its prime indicator of conduct in profits. the assumption being
that persistently high profits imply noncompetitive conduct. Thus the
Structure-Conduct-Performance trio soon evolved into a Structure-Profits duo.
During this evolution, Structure underwent a similar trans-
formation into Concentration. While entry conditions were not for-
gotten in the thinking about structure, they tended to be proxied by
their putative effects on structure instead of being measured directly.
Many honorable exceptions aside, the most influential line of research
followed the assumption that the amount of successful entry into an
industry would vary inversely with the height of its entry barriers.
Hence an industry in which sales remained highly concentrated for a long
time was, ~ fortiori, protected by high entry barriers. On such grounds
it seemed possible to avoid the separate investigation of entry conditions
and thus to represent an industry's structure solely by a measure of its
concentration.
*This did not keep the earlier S-C-P researchers from assuming
advertising to be anticompetitive (mainly on the grounds that the perfectly
competitive firm does not advertise). According to recent research, however,
advertising is more often pro-competitive than not. See Ayanian (1975),
for example.7
These compromises result in the working hypothesis that high
concentration causes high profits. To supply the hypothesis with content
we must decide (1) how we should measure profits; (2) how we should
define concentration, (3) what form of positive association between the
two we should look for, and (4) what we mean by an industry. It is
a serious defect that the hypothesis offers little help with these
decisions. Yet its very flexibility has made it durable. When a particu-
lar specified relation between particular measures of profits and con-
centration in a particular defined industry failed to show up. one could
blame the particularities and try another set of such.
The tenacious search for supporting evidence has been due
largely to historical accident. In the earliest test of the hypothesis,
Bain (1951) found a weak but statistically significant association between
concentration and profits in a sample of 42 industries for the period
1936-1940. Probably because it was the first in the field, this study
became very influential and its finding came to be accepted as truth.
The several studies published soon afterward produced mixed results lead-
ing to no firm conclusions and leaving Bainls influence untouched. As
late as 1911, Weiss could say that tlpractically all observers are now
convinced that there is something to the traditional hypothesis. I! (Weiss,
1971, p. 371).
Recent results, however, undermine the hypothesis in a
fundamental way. As the earlier studies supporting the hypothesis
are reconsidered with larger samples, longer time periods, and, if appro-
priate, sounder statistical methods, two kinds of finding emerge.8
First, most of the positive associations between concentration and
profits vanish.* Second, those that remain fail, on closer inspection,
to be consistent with the basic idea behind the hypothesis. This idea,
it will be recalled, is that firms in concentrated industries can more
easily coordinate their actions, by tacit or explicit collusion, to
keep prices high and realize greater profits. If so. concentration
should permit higher profits among firms of all sizes in the industry.
Coordination, even if it were limited to the larger firms, would never-
theless shield the small ones as well. But Demsetz (1973) found that
the remaining positive associations between concentration and profits
hold only among the large firms, not the smaller ones. This pattern
suggests that the above-average profits earned by the leading firms in
concentrated industries generally reflect superior performance rather
than collusion. Indeed, the superior performance might well explain the
large firms' growth to dominance and hence the concentration of their
industries. If this is so, concentration, far from leading to collusive
behavior, actually emerges from competitive behavior. This position is
argued forcefully by Peltzman (1977) and Brozen (1978) among others.
These findings are raising serious doubts about the conventional
wisdom. Phillips (1976), for instance, recently concluded that we know
very little about the relation, if any, between market structure and
profitability. It is too early to say when the findings will penetrate
the minds of legislators, regulators, and judges. But it is already too
*See, for example, Brozen (1974, 1975).9
late to justify S-C-P's application to banking by its interindustry
results. That application must stand or fallon its own merits.
The Crucial Role of the Local-Market Concept
Since the later and more careful interindustry applications of
S-C-P had not yet appeared when serious research into banking competi-
tion began in the early 1960's, S-C-P seemed to be a natural organizing
framework. In place of separate industries one had separate local
markets for banking 'services but the analogy between them was obvious~
and the concepts of structure and conduct in local banking markets
introduced no additional problems. Indeed, these concepts seemed
easier to handle in banking. Because entry is controlled by state and
federal bodies, structure may more plausibly be identified with concentra-
tion; because public authorities collect so much information, the data on
prices and services are obtainable cheaply enough that conduct need not
be proxied by profits. In banking studies, therefore, Structure-
Conduct-Performance rapidly took the form of Concentration-Conduct
----(or Concentration-Performance according to some investigators, who
identify Performance with what we have been calling Conduct), and the
traditional hypothesis is that banking services are more expensive
in the more highly concentrated markets.
Regardless of the form in which it is applied to banking,
S-C-P forces us to assume that distinct geographic markets exist for each
banking service. By assumption, the banks in a given market compete for
the business of the buyers located only within that market. Each10
market must therefore be a self-contained unit. Since the structure of
this unit determines the conduct and performance of the banks within
it, a lot depends on our conception of structure. But no matter how
appropriate this conception is, it will be useless if we fail to identify
the market boundary.
s-c-p offers no help with the identification of local markets
and does not indicate the types, if any, of nonbank financial firms that
should be included in the market. These things have been handled in
about as many ways in banking as in the industrial sector. But despite
the generally poor results, the discussion tends to concern the particu-
larities rather than the approach itself.*
Many investigators-have identified banking markets with ready-
made political units such as counties, towns, or SMSA's. The dangers
of this practice are obvious, and the courts and regulatory authorities
have tried to better it by using bank records to identify the geographic
area in which a particular bank draws its customers. This approach ignores
the potential customers who could be drawn to the bank by a more attractive
price service package. Moreover, it cannot determine how many banks should
be considered together in this manner. The resulting market areas are
highly sensitive to the way in which this determination is made.**
*Thus Austin's (1977) comprehensive survey of the issues in this
field, while quite critical of many particular ways in which the approach
has been carried out, never questions the validity of the approach itself.
**See Austin (1969) for a vivid demonstration of this sensitivity.11
Probably the most attractive approach to defining local markets
is that of Stolz (1976),' who used economic and demographic data to delin-
eate "areas of convenience" within which most local residents work and
shop. Stolz assumed that these"areas of' convenience" would be the
relevant markets for a wide range of bank products and services,
such as demand and time deposits, car loans, farm operating loans, and
farm machinery loans.
This approach to banking markets can be tested statistically.
If each market indeed represents a distinct group of buyers and sellers
of a particluar bank~g service, its prices should be fairly homogeneous.
Prices might differ between markets in response to intermarket
differences in factors affecting supply and demand; but since such differ-
ences do not exist within a market (by definition), the dispersion of
prices within markets should be small relative to the dispersion across
them. An analysis of variance indicates, however, that this is the case for
only a few of the 14 continuous price and service variables considered
* by Stolz.
In other words, the variance within most of the markets is so
large relative to the variance between them that the markets cannot be
distinguished on the basis of individual price and service variables.
Actual banking markets thus remain exceedingly difficult to identifY.
*For two variables in Iowa, three in Minnesota, and four in
Wisconsin, the F-ratio was significantly large at the 5 percent level
(see the appendix below for details). We are indebted to Stolz for the
use of his data.12
Problems Inherent in the Local-Market Concept
~nings which remain elusive despite diligent search often
turn out to be ill-defined or even nonexistent. That this might be
the case with the concept of distinct local banking markets is
suggested by three considerations. First, the concept of a local market
implicitly rests on the assumption that Ioeational convenience is of
paramount importance to the consumer. It is implausible to assume con-
currently that the importance of this factor ends at the market boundary.
If location considerations prevent competition between markets, as S-C-P
forces us to assume, they must also affect competition within each market.
While this is partly a matter of structure ( structural measures should
depend on time or distance as well as the number and size distribution
* o~ banks ), it must make us wonder whether the conventional concept of a
market is appropriate.
Second, in areas where population centers are not separated by
large sparsely populated regions, the market boundaries must be somewhat
arbitrary. Customers who are located near the boundaries could bank
conveniently in either market. The competition between both markets'
banks for these borderline customers blurs the distinction between the
markets.
Third, it is difficult to believe that consumers care only
about locational convenience. It is more reasonable to expect them to
care about a variety of banking characteristics, of which locational
*We are indebted to Alton Gilbert for this observation.13
convenience is only one: business hours, prices, lending policies, etc.
If consumers are always willing to trade some Ioeational convenience for,
say, a better price, one cannot establish a definite boundary around the
area in which a group of people will select a bank. That area depends,
in part, on the vigor of competition among the banks.
This feedback of competition on local market areas creates a
problem for the traditional hypothesis, which implies a one-way flow of
causation from market structure to competition and performance. Since
competitive behavior partially determines the market and hence the market's
structure, it cannot be explained solely by that structure. This
is the fundamental conceptual defect of the conventional Structure-
Conduct-Performance approach.
This conceptual defect could be of minor practical significance
if the effect of competition-on markets and structure were negligible
compared to the effect of structure on conduct and performance. If that
were so, it would surely show up in the data. The failure of numerous
research efforts to detect a clear connection between market structure and
performance persuades us that it is not so. On the contrary. we conclude
that the practical difficulty of identifying markets issues from the
conceptual ambiguity of the market itself.
The Local-Market Concept is a Distraction
To see just how distracting the local-market concept is, let us
waive the above objections and assume that the market problem is solvable
in priciple. What does the problem look like from an abstract point of view?14
We begin with a set X of banks--all the banks in the country--and
wish to allocate them tq subsets that correspond to local markets. Abstractly,
then. the problem is to define a family of subsets of X.
We might believe that there are several families of subsets,
corresponding to different banking services; the local market for farm
loans, for example, might differ from that for time deposits. We might
also believe that some of the subsets of a given family intersect, i.e.,
that a bank can belong to more than one market for a given service. Alter-
natively, we might believe that the subsets do not intersect, i.e., that
they partition X. Whatever we believe to be true of the family, we must
in any case assign banks to their appropriate subsets. If this assignment
were always obvious. we would have a characteristic function f M for each
subset M: for each bank x.
if xEM
otherwise.
In words, if bank x belongs to market M then fM(X) = 1; if not, then
fM(x) = O. We can say, therefore, that if the assignment of banks to
markets were never uncertain, each market would have a characteristic
function whose range is {O,l}.
But of course the assignment will in many cases be uncertain.
It will not always be obvious whether a particular bank does or
does not belong to market M. * A local market is therefore a fuzzy set :
in place of a characteristic function that takes values in the two-
element set {a.l}. it has a membership function taking values in the
*See Zadeh (1965).15
closed interval [0,1]. If the membership fUnction for market Mis gM'
then gM{x) shows the degree of membership of bank x in the market. If
x un~uestionably belongs to M, then gM(x) = 1; if x un~uestionably does
not belong to M, then gM(x) = 0; if membership is ~uestionable. then
gM(x) is strictly between 0 and 1, being larger the more likely it 1s
that x properly belongs to M. Hence the assignment of banks to markets
is equivalent to the assignment of a membership number from [0,1] to
each bank with respect to each market. This is the market-delineation
problem considered abstractly.*
Without going into the particular factors that we would
consider in choosing membership numbers in the uncertain cases, we think
the general nature of those factors is clear. Suppose gM(X) =1; then
in choosing a value for gM(Y) we will have to consider the competitive
forces between banks x and y. If these forces are strong, we will put
gM(y) equal to 1 or close to it; if they are weak, we will put gM(y)
equal to zero or near it. In other words, we can properly delineate
local markets only if we canevaluate the com~etitiye torceScbetween
banks. But if we can do this we can deal with competitive conditions
*If we could solve this problem, we might use the solution in a
regression analysis (for example) to multiply the individual-bank data by
the value of the membership function. Thus, if gM(x) = I, gN(x) = .5)
gR(x) = .2, and gT(x) = a for all other markets T, then instead of using
one observation vector for bank x in the regression, we would use three:
the given vector with the structure of market M, one-half that vector with
the structure of market N, and two-tenths of that vector with the structure
of market R.16
directly'; we willi not have to proxy them by some index of local-market
structure. Ironically, the more accurately we can delineate local markets,
the less we need the local-market concept. Market delineation, so
essential to S-C-p. distracts us from the main issues.
A Possible Alternative
Trying to solve a scientific problem (or indeed any problem)
is like trying to traverse a maze. Wherever we might be in relation to
our goal, we can proceed along any of several paths, each of which is
a potential blind alley. We must, therefore, constantly search for signs
that we have taken such a path. When the signs have accumulated suffi-
ciently we must abandon our path, however comfortably familiar it might be,
and set out on a new one. The abandonment of a blind alley is progress.
We therefore feel no compulsion to present, at this time, a fully developed
alternative to S-C_P. However, the following remarks suggest an approach
that may prove to be fruitful.
The essential idea behind the S-C-P approach is that competitive
potential affects behavior. The approach expresses this idea in a
particular form. That this form is unproductive does not mean that the
idea is wrong. What is wrong is the denial of tradeoffs between
locational convenience and other aspects of bank services, and thus
the denial of potential competition between banks in different "markets."
We might as well make a virtue of necessity and not only admit
but exploit the fact that, in some appropriate sense, all banks poten-
tially compete with each other. Instead of beginning with the extreme17
assumption that the population of banks can be divided into subsets
constituting local markets, it seems better to begin at the opposite
extreme: all banks constitute one market, over which, however, competitive
potential is distributed unevenly.
It is no objection that people tend to bank near their homes
or businesses. Admittedly, distance and the associated transportation
costs give banks an advantage over their distant rivals in attracting
local customers, but they do not preclude competition between them. Any
bank that tries to exploit its advantage too intensively will lose
customers to distant rivals. The desire for profits will therefore lead
the banks to protect the part of their business that is cheapest to
protect--that of their local customers. Hence consumers tend to deal
with the closest bank, not in spite of the competition with distant banks
but because of it. That consumers tend to bank locally is, therefore, as
consistent with the assumption of one market as with the assumption of
many.
The one-market assumption acknowledges the importance of loca-
tional convenience but avoids the necessity of classifying banks as either
convenient to a group of customers or not convenient. Rather, it suggests
that any bank offering a sufficiently attractive product will become
"convenient" to any consumer. Naturally, it will rarely pay distant banks
to do this. Competition for more distant customers is more expensive.
Anything that increases the costs of competing for distant
customers will obstruct the competition between distant banks and,
therefore, permit competition to be less evenly distributed over the
banking system. The branching limitations imposed by many states act18
precisely in this manner. To gain some insight into their effects, we
have further analyzed Stolz·s data. As mentioned above, only a minority of
his fourteen price and service variables took significantly different
values in different convenience areas. In Iowa, however, which
permits some branching in either the same county as the home office or a
contiguous county, and where only two variables differed significantly
between convenience areas, eight differed significantly between counties.*
!n Wisconsin, which has only permitted limited branching since 1968,
four variables differed significantly between convenience areas and the same
four differed significantly between counties. In Minnesota, a unit
banking state, only three variables differed between convenience areas
and three also differed between counties.
In Iowa, competition is distributed more evenly within and less
evenly between counties than it is in the other two states because the
branching regulations do not so appreciably raise the costs of competing
within counties as they do in Wisconsin and even more so in Minnesota.
We believe, therefore, that competition is more adequately
viewed in terms of the strength of rivalry between banks than in terms of
the number of local options available to a specific group of customers.
Indeed, the number of options available to the customers should be viewed
as a by-product of the competitive forces acting on the banks in the
region. Some evidence supports this view. For example, Jacobs (1971)
found that while rates on business loans decline slightly with decreases
in concentration, they decline significantly with liberalizations of the
*See the appendix for details.19
branching laws. And when Horvitz (1968) calculated the dispersion in
rates paid on time deposits and certificates of deposit in a number of
.geographical regions, he found it to be smaller the less restrictive
the branching laws. Both patterns show that decreasing the costs of
competing increases the strength of competition and evens out its
distribution. Neither pattern can be explained by S-C-P.
The one-market assumption directs our attention away from the
conventional framework's curious proxies for competitive conditions
(concentration ratios, Herfindahl indexes, and the like) to a more direct
consideration of competition itself, both in the sense of action
(competitivebehavior) and in the sense of conditions (competitive potential).
Competitive behavior is the attempt to attract and keep customers;
competitive potential determines how strenuous the effort must be and
how successful it is. The meaningof competitive behavior thus suggests
lines of inquiry into competitive potential.
The initial attraction of S-C-P was its apparent shortcut
past that inquiry. Instead of a research program concerned with the
measurement of competitive potential, it held out the apparently easier
targets of delineating local markets and measuring structure. Experience
proves that the apparent shortcut is a dead end. The one-market assumption
suggests questions that, though more difficult to answer, go directly to
the issues. It might even point us in the right direction.20
Appendix
Analysis of variance allows us to evaluate an assignment of
banks to putative local markets. Taking a given price or service variable,
say the rate of interest on car loans, we compute the mean value of the
variable in each market, the variation of these means about the overall
sample mean, and the variation within each market. The variation of the
market means about the overall sample mean measureg the part of overall
sample variation accounted for by differences between markets. The
better the assignment, the larger is this part and the smaller is the part
originating from variation within each market, which is, of course, wholly
unaccounted for by the assignment. The F- ratio--the ratio of the former
to the latter after both are divided by their degrees of freedom--
therefore permits an evaluation of the assignment. If the assignment
is completely artificial, so that the putative markets are imaginary,
the F-ratio will tend to 1. But the larger the F-ratio the harder
it is to accept the null hypothesis that the assignment is artificial. If
the ratio exceeds the critical value associated with a given level of
statistical significance, say one percent or five percent, we reject the
null hypothesis and conclude, with some risk, that the assignment is
not completely artificial. To reduce this risk we perform similar
analyses on a number of price and service variables and observe the pro-
portion of them for which the null hypothesis is rejected. A large pro-
portion of such rejections will incline us more favorably to the assign-
ment, a small proportion will lead us to doubt it.21
Table I presents the results of these analyses for all of
the continuous variables studied by Stolz. As the Table shows,
for only one variable is the F-ratio significantly large in all
three states; for two variables it is significantly large in two
of the three states. Of the total of 42 ratios computed for all
three states, only nine are significantly large at the 5 percent
level. In our judgment, this proportion is too small to rationalize
the market assignment.
Stolz's convenience-areas are not, of course, without economic
significance. The banks within an area tend to exert more competitive
potential on each other than on banks outside the area. Competitive
forces "pdLe up" in these areas and induce the banks within them
to compete more vigorously with each other than with banks outside
them. This is why some of the F-ratios are significantly large.
To check this reasoning, we performed a similar analysis of variance
on arbitrarily defined markets; that is, we randomly grouped the
banks of each state into 25 "markets" and computed the F-ratios as
above. As expected, none of the ratios were significantly large at
the 5-percent level.
We performed a similar analysis of a market partition determined
strictly by counties. Table II reports the results. Here considerably
more of the ratios are significantly large. This does not mean that
counties approximate the local markets postulated by the conventional
approach more closely than Stolz's convenience-areas do. Indeed,22
Stolz's method would represent an appropriate procedure for obtaining
such a local-market partition if the conventional market concept were
valid. It is just that competitive potential tends to pile up in each
tYIJe of "market," forcing some degree of homogeneity on the banks within
it. However, the potential extends past both kinds of "market" boundary,
and its effect on banks in other lImarket s
ll is a matter of more-or-less
and not some-or-none.Table 1
F RATIOS ASSOCIATED WITH STOLZ'S MARKETS
Variable
Annual percentage rate-paid on:
Passbook savings ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
90-day deposits .................•••...•.•...
One-year certificates of deposit ••••••••••••
Four-year certificates of deposit
Service charge on a standardized
personal checking account •••••••••••••••••••
Typical charge for a returned check
Annual percentage rate charged on:
A 36..;month-instal.rnent new automobile loan •••
A standardized new farm machine loan
maturing in three years .
A one-year farm operating loan secured
by crops or livestock .














Total hours bank is open for business:
During week . 1.17 1.28 1.08
On Saturday .................................... 2.75** 2.55** 1.81*
Monday-Friday during the core period
(9:00 a-m, to 3:00 p.m.) .







1. Iowa, 109 banks and 25 markets; Minnesota, 113 banks and 25 markets;
Wisconsin, 111 banks and 25 marketa,
* Significant at 5-percent level (the critical value is 1.66).
** Significant at I-percent level (the critical value is 2.05 in Iowa and
Wisconsin and 2.04 in Minnesota).Table 2
r RATIOS ASSOCIATED WITH COUNTY MARKEl'S
Variable
90-day deposits •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
One-year certificates of deposit ••••••••••••
A one-year :farm operating loan secured















Four-year certificates of deposit
Typical charge for a returned check
Service charge on a standardized
personal checking acco'lUlt •••••••••••••••••••
Annual percentage rate paid on:
Passbook savings ••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••
A standardized new farm machine loan
maturing in three years •••••••••••••••••••
Annual percentage rate charged on:
A 36-month-instaJ..rnent new automobile loan •••
Annual charge :for smallest-size
eaf'eby-depoedt box ••••••••••••••••••••••••'.'
Total hours bank is open for business:
During week •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
On Saturday ................................. 2.84**
L16
2.93**
Monday-Friday during the core period
(9:00 a-m, to 3:00 p.m.) •••••••••••••••••• 1.70* L08 L48
Monday-Friday other than the core period •••• L23
1. Iowa, 109 banks and 45 markets; Minnesota, 113 banks and 43 markets;
Wisconsin, 111 banks and 40 markets.
* Signi:ficant at 5-percent level (the critical value is 1.58).
** Significant at Leper-cent level (the critical value is 1.93 in Iowa and
1.91 in Minnesota and Wisconsin).References
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